The answers discussed so far aim to show that realists are actually not attached to the supposedly implausible implications (i.e. some moral disputes are only obvious) to which anti-realists want to link them. Another way to react is to bite the bullet, insist that the implications are acceptable, and explain their counterintuitiveness in a way that is compatible with realism. A crude version of relativism is the simple kind of subjectivism that says that to say that an action is good or bad means to report something about one`s attitude toward it. When Jane says that eating meat is wrong while Eric claims it is allowed, Jane expresses the belief that she disapproves of eating meat, while Eric expresses the belief that he does not disapprove of her. Since the two beliefs may be true, they are not incompatible. A common objection to subjectivism is that it therefore presents implausible paradigmatic cases of moral disagreement as merely obvious (Moore 1912, chap. 3), which shows how facts related to moral disagreement can help a moral realist. MFT has never claimed to offer an exhaustive list of moral foundations. From the beginning, we tried to identify the candidates for whom the evidence was strongest, and we actively sought arguments and evidence for additional foundations. The first winner of the Moral Foundations Challenge was John Jost, who indicated that we don`t care about freedom and oppression.
As described in section 4.1.4, we have already begun empirical work testing freedom/oppression as the sixth possible basis. The second winner was the team of Elizabeth Shulman and Andrew Mastronarde, who suggested that concerns about waste and inefficiency, especially when a group is trying to achieve a common goal, elicit an emotional response that is not related to any of the other fundamentals. The third winner was Polly Wiessner, an anthropologist who found that issues of ownership and ownership occur everywhere, even among the ! Kung Bushmen, whom she studies, and that concerns about property have obvious precursors in the ability of animals to recognize and protect their own territories. Let us look at the example of the good. Kindness is an evaluative statement. In value theory, we can say that something is good in two ways. But on the contrary, I understand morality_Bob as something that unfolds in Bob`s morality – like the way you can describe in 6 states and 2 symbols a Turing machine that writes 4,640 × 101439 1 on its tape before it stops. The idea that an insufficient amount of reflection is considered a deficiency may justify focusing in particular on disagreements between philosophers, as Brian Leiter (2014) does. One problem, however, is that the available characterizations of the corresponding reflection method are rather vague. This can make it difficult to determine whether a person has used it competently or not.
Moreover, the question of how to specify such a method, and even if it should be applied at all, is controversial within philosophy. The same applies to other potential candidates with relevant gaps. For example, what about cases where our moral beliefs are influenced by our emotions? It is common to think of such an influence as a distorting factor (p.B. Singer 2005 and Sayre-McCord 2015), but with some views in moral epistemology and given the benign roles that emotions sometimes play in cognitive processes, it may be necessary to qualify it (see Le Doux 1996 and Nussbaum 2001 for two influential narratives on the epistemic meaning of emotions). Before these and many related issues have been resolved, and thus we have compiled a comprehensive list of clearly defined factors that are considered gaps, any confident estimate of the extent to which the existing moral disagreement is radical may seem premature. Perhaps Richard thinks we might assume that abortion is actually banned by morality_Bob and allowed by morality_Sally, as there are at least two possible minds for which this would be true. Then both heads could be wrong if they think they don`t agree. .